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The Contribution of Wealth Concentration to the Subprime Crisis: 
A Quantitative Estimation 
 
Thomas Goda and Photis Lysandrou

 
 
Abstract 
The crisis that broke out in mid-2007 was caused by the fact that the CDO market had grown to 
a size sufficient to wreak general havoc when it suddenly collapsed. Several authors have argued 
that economic inequality was important to the growth of this market. This paper attempts to 
strengthen this argument by concentrating attention on global wealth concentration. After 
summarising recent evidence on the negative impact of investor demand on US bond yields in 
the pre-crisis period, new evidence regarding the specific contribution of high net worth 
individuals to this negative impact is presented. The paper then goes on to show how, after 
having helped to cause a yield problem in the major US debt markets, high net worth individuals 
(via hedge funds) continued to be a major source of the pressure on US banks to resolve this 
yield problem through the mass production of CDOs.  
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1. Introduction 
The toxic securities at the epicentre of the financial crisis of 2007-8 were collateralised debt 
obligations (CDOs). The market for these products had remained fairly small up to about 2002, 
but between that time and early 2007 it had grown twelvefold in size, from US$ 
1
/4 trillion to 
approximately US$3 trillion, in other words, to a size sufficient to spread panic in the money and 
interbank markets when it totally collapsed in August that year. This fact suggests that economic 
inequality had to figure somewhere in the crisis given that it was subprime and other non-
conforming mortgage loans that formed the basic raw material needed for the construction of 
CDOs and given that many of those who took out these loans belonged to the poorer end of the 
American population (see e.g. Fernandez et al., 2008; Horn et al., 2009; Wade, 2009; Palma, 
2009; Stockhammer, 2009; Rajan, 2010; van Treeck, 2013). However, what remains in doubt is 
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whether inequality had a more centrally causal role, for although low incomes can explain the 
demand for mortgage loans they cannot on their own explain why these loans were securitised 
and then re-securitised into the collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) that were sold to 
investors.  
This paper attempts to rectify this shortfall in explanatory power by directing attention to a 
hitherto underexplored aspect of inequality. While most studies of the role played by inequality 
in the financial crisis have focussed on its ‘dispersion’ aspect, the distribution of income and 
wealth across different groups of people, this study will focus on its ‘concentration’ aspect, the 
accumulation of wealth in the hands of one very small group of people, the high net worth 
individuals (HNWIs). The central argument is that just as stagnant incomes of the bottom 90% in 
the US were among the ‘supply-push’ factors driving CDO growth inasmuch as mortgage loans 
constituted the raw material for these products, so was wealth concentration among the world’s 
richest individuals one of the ‘demand-pull’ factors. The wealth holdings of these HNWIs more 
than doubled between 1997 and 2007 (from US$ 19 to US$ 41 trillion) and their share of total 
global private sector wealth increased from 31.6% in 2001 to 35.3% in 2007
1
. The subsequent 
increase in HNWI’s investment demand not only helped to lower the yield of highly rated 
traditional bond classes, which contributed to a ‘search for yield’ by all investors, but also led to 
increasing assets being placed under the management of hedge funds who were the major buyers 
of CDOs. 
The argument is developed in three stages. The first concerns the demand for traditional US 
debt securities. To give credibility to the claim that the production of CDOs was rapidly 
expanded between 2002 and 2007 partly in order to absorb the overspill of demand for yield 
flowing from the other US debt markets, it helps to show that the unusually low yields in these 
other markets over this same period was in large part caused by the pressure from investors. The 
second stage concerns the estimation of HNWIs’ contribution to the downward pressure on US 
bond yields. This contribution needs to be separated out from the various other sources of US 
bond demand and quantified if the concentration of private wealth ownership is to be shown to 
have been a major driver behind the growth of CDOs. The third stage concerns the relation 
between HNWIs and hedge funds. As HNWIs were excluded from the CDO market due to the 
highly complex nature of these structured credit products the claim that they contributed to the 
pressure to create these products can only hold up if there is a clear explanation as to how they 
were involved. A close examination of the HNWI – hedge fund relation helps provide that 
explanation. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section two reviews some recent evidence on the 
impact of US bond demand on US bond yields in the pre-crisis period. Section three presents 
new evidence on the impact of high net worth individuals (HNWIs) on US bond yields. Section 
four specifies why US income inequality and global wealth concentration provided the all-
encompassing framework for the mass production of CDOs. Section five concludes. 
2. The impact of investor demand on US bond yields 
The rapid growth of CDO production between 2002 and 2007 closely correlated with some 
other unusual developments in the US financial system over this period. One was the persistently 
low nominal long-term yields in all of the major US bond markets, a development that 
eventually gave rise to a much discussed bond yield ‘conundrum’ after June 2004 in that long 
term yields continued to remain low even as the Federal Funds rate began to rise sharply from 
this date (see Figure 1). The other was the steep increase in the volumes of private domestic 
investor demand and more importantly of foreign inflows into the US bond market (see Figure 
2). The latter appears to have been due not only to inflows from Asian and other emerging 
market economies but also to inflows from Western European economies (albeit that in their 
case leverage rather than export surpluses was the major source of funds (Bernanke et al., 
2011)).  
< Figure 1 > 
< Figure 2 > 
There are basically two views regarding the correlation between US bond yields and CDO 
growth. The majority view is that there is no deeper causal link behind this correlation. Yields in 
the traditional US debt markets may have been unusually low in the immediate pre-crisis period 
and so investors would have been happy to accept the higher yielding CDOs
2
, but this admission 
aside, the general belief continues to be that greed, overconfidence, market failures and lax 
regulation were the more important motivating forces behind the rapid acceleration in CDO 
production prior to mid-2007 (see e.g. IMF, 2008; Akerlof and Shiller, 2009; Ashcraft and 
Schuermann, 2008; Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011; Demyanyk and van Hemert, 
2011). A number of authors (see e.g. Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2009; Gros, 2009; 
Lysandrou, 2009; Caballero, 2010; Bernanke et al. 2011) have advanced the complementary 
view that there was in fact a line of causality running from the pressure of aggregate foreign and 
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domestic demand on yields in the traditional US bond markets through to the CDO market but 
this has remained to date a minority view. 
The most likely explanation for this state of affairs is that there has been relatively little work 
done to quantify the impact of aggregate investor demand on US bond yields in the pre-crisis 
period. It is true that in response to the post-2004 bond yield ‘conundrum’ a number of studies 
investigated the impact of demand on US Treasury yields and found that impact to have been 
significantly negative (e.g. Idier et al., 2007; Bandholz et al., 2009; Craine and Martin, 2009; 
Warnock and Cacdac Warnock, 2009; Bertaut et al., 2011). However, while these results 
represent a first step towards strengthening the demand-pull version of the CDO growth story 
they are not sufficient. CDOs are in the end ‘second-floor’ debt securities, securities backed by 
securities. Thus if credibility is to be given to the claim that the US CDO market was expanded 
just prior to 2007 partly in order to take the overspill of demand for yield flowing from the other 
US debt markets it helps to show that investors had a significant negative impact not only on the 
Treasury yield but also on the yields in the other ‘ground floor’ markets (those for corporate and 
municipal debt securities) and also on the yield in the ‘first floor’ market (that for agency debt 
securities). Evidence to this effect has been recently provided by Goda et al. (2011) using 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) based econometric models (for more details see the 
Appendix). Here we briefly present their main findings regarding the marginal cumulative 
impact (MCI) of investor demand on US bond yields during the ‘conundrum’ period3. 
Treasury yield 
The results of the Treasury model show that the increase in the holdings ratio
4 
of foreign 
governments had a negative impact on the 10-year Treasuries yield in the short-run and in the 
long-run (see Appendix, Table A1). Thus, the increase in their holdings ratio (from 32.4% to 
42%) depressed the yield by as much as 60 bp during the ‘conundrum’ period, as shown in 
Figure 3a. This finding is similar to that reported in previous studies. By contrast, foreign private 
investors had no discernible impact on the Treasury yield in this period (see Figure 3b). 
< Figure 3 > 
Agency bond yield 
Foreign official demand also had a significant negative impact on the 10-year agency bond 
yield in the short-run and in the long-run (see Appendix, Table A2 and Table A3, column 1). As 
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shown in Figure 4a, the increase in the foreign official holdings ratio depressed the yield by as 
much as 107 bp during the ‘conundrum’ period. Other sources of demand also had a negative, 
albeit smaller, impact on the agency yield in this period. As shown in Figures 4b-4d, private 
foreigners, US individuals, and US pension funds helped to reduce the long-term agency bond 
yield by as much as 39 bp, 17 bp, and 11 bp respectively.  
< Figure 4 > 
Corporate bond yield 
Between 1994 and mid-2007 foreign private investors invested heavily in the AAA-rated 
corporate bond market (their holdings ratio more than doubling, from 11% to 24.5%) with the 
result that they put significant downward pressure on corporate bond yields in the short-run and 
long-run (see Appendix, Table A2 and Table A3). As shown in Figure 5a, between June 2004 
and June 2007 the AAA-rated corporate bond yield was lowered by as much as 69 bp by foreign 
private investors’ demand pressure. US individual investors and banks also had some negative 
impact in the short-run when they increased their holdings ratio (see Appendix, Table A2); as 
shown in Figures 5b and 5c, they respectively decreased the yield by as much as 12 bp and 13 bp 
in the ‘conundrum’ period.  
< Figure 5 > 
Municipal bond yield 
Although the increase in foreign holdings of municipal bonds was relatively modest during 
the ‘conundrum’ period, their increasing holdings ratio had a negative impact on the yields of 
AAA-rated 10-year municipal bonds (see Appendix, Table A2 and Table A3). As shown in 
Figure 6a, foreign investors helped to lower the yield by as much as 31 bp in the ‘conundrum’ 
period. Although the MCI of foreign investors was higher than the MCIs of domestic individual 
investors, banks and insurance companies (see Figures 6b-6d), domestic investors as a group 
lowered the municipal bond yield in this period by as much as 34 bp. The relatively strong 
market reaction to the small increase in the foreign holdings ratio can be probably explained by 
the fact that the entry of this new market player reduced investment opportunities that the big 
domestic market players would have liked to have retained for themselves. 
< Figure 6 > 
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In sum, the results from Goda et al. (2011) appear to give solid empirical support to the claim 
that aggregate investor demand was a major source of the downward pressure on US bond yields 
in the pre-subprime crisis period. In particular, they show that foreign official investors had a 
major suppressing effect on yields in the Treasury and agency bond markets and that foreign and 
domestic private investors had a similar effect in the corporate and municipal bond markets. This 
latter observation raises the question as to how significant a proportion of this private sector 
pressure on yields stemmed from an important subgroup of this sector, namely that comprising 
of the world’s high net worth individuals. The next section tries to answer this question. 
 
3. The impact of HNWIs on US bond yields 
According to Capgemini and Merrill Lynch (2008) the number of HNWIs – individuals with 
net assets in excess of US$ 1 million (excluding primary residences) – was around 10 million in 
2007, a figure that represented just 0.15% of the world’s population of 6.6 billion. The 
supposition that these individuals could have had any significant impact in the US bond markets 
in the pre-subprime crisis era may seem incredible when one considers how small in number 
they were but not when one considers the amounts of wealth they concentrated in their hands 
and the forms in which this wealth was stored. As shown in Figure 7a, in 2007 the world’s 
HNWIs had approximately US$ 41 trillion in assets (world GDP in that year was US$ 55 trillion) 
as compared with approximately US$ 19 trillion in 1997
5
, which is to say that prior to the crisis 
HNWIs were the biggest global investor group with more assets under management than global 
pension funds (US$ 28 trillion), mutual funds (US$ 26 trillion) and insurance companies 
(US$ 20 trillion) (IFSL, 2008a). As can be seen in Figure 7b, financial securities represented one 
of the dominant forms in which HNWIs stored their wealth, accounting for an average of 54% 
for the whole period from 2002 to 2007. 
< Figure 7 > 
Given that HNWI asset allocation to debt securities accounted for US$ 11 trillion in 2007 
(roughly 14% of the total global stock of debt securities in that year) and that private investor 
demand influenced US bond yields, it seems clear to us that HNWIs must also have had a 
negative influence on yields by virtue of what we can call their ‘blocking’ role. When Caballero 
(2010) argued that the US banking sector’s response to the world’s ‘insatiable’ demand for US 
safe assets between 2002 and 2007 was to expand the production of CDOs, he went on to 
  7 
describe this response as “the minimum resistance path for the safe-assets imbalance to release 
its energy” (p.3). Our hypothesis is that the HNWIs contributed to this process because they held 
enough US assets during this same period as to help block any alternative exits through which 
the safe-assets imbalance could release its energy. Unfortunately, there exists no precise 
information about the actual wealth and holdings of HNWIs because existing global governance 
arrangements allow them to be highly mobile and secretive. However, some approximate 
estimates of the degree of HNWI involvement in the US bond markets in the immediate pre-
2007 period can be extracted from the known HNWI investment figures. As concerns the 
estimate for US HNWI holdings of US bonds, these are derived in two steps: (i) we know the 
amount of assets held by North American HNWIs (see Figure 7a) and we know from Credit 
Suisse (2010, p. 82) that “...residents of the USA account for about 90% of the [HNWI 
population] figure for Northern America”; multiplying the resulting amount of US HNWIs 
wealth with the average global HNWI investment share in fixed income securities during this 
time (i.e.23%) gives us the totals for US HNWIs global bond investments as listed in column 1 
of Table 1; (ii) we know from Capgemini and Merrill Lynch (2006) that about 78% of US 
HNWI portfolio holdings are invested domestically, so we apply this ratio to the total US HNWI 
global bond investments to derive the approximate figures for US HNWI holdings of US bonds 
that are listed in column 2 of Table 1. These figures on average represent about 58% of all US 
individual investments in US bonds according to the Flow of Funds data presented in column 3 
of Table 1
6
. The application of this 58% ratio to the Flow of Funds data on US individual 
holdings in each bond class enables us to derive the equivalent estimated US HNWI holdings of 
Treasury, agency, corporate and municipal bonds, as listed in Table 2. 
< Table 1 > 
< Table 2 > 
To calculate the rest of the world (ROW) HNWI US bond holdings some assumptions are 
again necessary. The first is that the total amount of fixed income holdings of ROW HNWIs is 
equal to total HNWI fixed income investment minus the amount of US HNWI global bond 
investment, see Table 3. The second assumption is that ROW HNWIs invested around 30% of 
their fixed income investment in foreign markets; according to data from Fidora et al. (2006) 
non-US investors on average placed around 70% of their investment in their home market. The 
third assumption is that ROW HNWIs investments in foreign bond markets are allocated 
according to their respective market sizes; thus multiplying ROW HNWI foreign bond holdings 
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by the global market share of the US debt security market gives us the estimated amounts of 
ROW HNWI US bond holdings (see Table 4). 
< Table 3 > 
< Table 4 > 
It is unlikely that the holdings of ROW HNWIs were split evenly between Treasury, agency, 
corporate and municipal bonds. Therefore, one last assumption is necessary to get an idea about 
the size of ROW HNWIs holdings in the different US bond markets. It is known that a 
significant amount of wealth from HNWIs is held offshore (see e.g. Tax Justice Network, 2005). 
Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the bond portfolio composition of ROW HNWIs is 
similar to the portfolio composition of foreign investors that bought Treasuries, agency and 
corporate bonds via tax havens and financial centres
7
. Furthermore, it can be assumed that a 
significant part of foreign municipal bond holdings (around one third) is held by HNWIs as these 
bonds are particular attractive for individuals due to their tax status
8
. The resulting estimates of 
ROW HNWIs US bond holdings according to bond type are given in Table 5.  
< Table 5 > 
Summing across the estimated holdings of US bonds by US HNWIs and ROW HNWIs for 
the period 2004 to 2007, see Table 6, two distinct patterns become clear. The first is that HNWIs, 
along with other private sector investors, appear to have been partially squeezed out of the US 
Treasury market as a result of the steep increase in the foreign official holdings of Treasuries. 
The second is that HNWIs, again in common with other private sector investors, reacted to the 
partial squeeze out of Treasuries by shifting substantial amounts of funds into the other major 
US bond markets. 
< Table 6> 
According to the models of Goda et al. (2011), private foreign and US individual investors 
put pressure on AAA-rated bond yields if they increased their holdings to a greater extent than 
the increase in the outstanding amount of these bonds. The same must be true for HNWIs 
because they are an important subgroup of private foreign and US individual investors as our 
estimates have shown. To obtain estimates for the impact of HNWIs on US long-term bond 
yields for the period June 2004 to June 2007 we therefore use the data contained in Table 2 and 
Table 5 and the MCIs of private foreign and individual investors. To be more precise, we first 
calculate the share of US HNWIs in total US individual holdings and the share of ROW HNWIs 
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in total foreign private holdings for each bond class and then multiply these shares with the 
respective MCIs of US individual investors and foreign private investors (see Figures 3 – 6) to 
obtain the MCIs of US and ROW HNWIs in each bond class; we finally sum these monthly 
MCIs of US and ROW HNWIs to obtain the total estimated impact of all HNWIs in each bond 
class. These MCIs reveal that, as expected, HNWIs had no discernible impact on the Treasury 
yield (Figure 8a), while they did have a significant negative impact on the long-term yields of 
agency bonds (by as much as 15 bp, Figure 8b), of AAA-rated corporate bonds (by a maximum 
of 18 bp, Figure 8c) and of AAA-rated municipal bonds (by as much as 12 bp, Figure 8d). 
Generally speaking, HNWIs seem to have depressed US long-term bond yields to a similar 
degree as changes in business cycle expectations, interest rate volatility and default risk (see 
Goda et al., 2011). 
< Figure 8 > 
To sum up, apart from US Treasuries, HNWIs did have a consistently negative impact on US 
bond yields in the pre-crisis period according to our estimations. These are, we repeat, rough 
approximations. However, we believe that, while not totally accurate, these estimations are 
sufficiently accurate as to validate our HNWI ‘blocking’ hypothesis. In the pre-crisis period this 
small group of individuals occupied enough space in the US bond markets as to prevent them 
from being able to fully accommodate the demand pressure for debt securities stemming from 
other investor groups, a development that in turn helps to explain why the CDO market had to be 
rapidly expanded in this period in order to absorb the excess pressure. The precise mechanism 
through which the pressure for yield was transmitted to those institutions that created the CDOs 
is explained in the next section. 
 
4. Income inequality, wealth concentration and the growth of the ABS and CDO markets 
The global stock of CDOs outstanding in June 2007 amounted to some US$ 3 trillion as 
compared with approximately US$ 11 trillion worth of asset backed securities (ABS) and 
approximately US$ 66 trillion worth of government and corporate bonds (Blundell-Wignall, 
2007b; Bank of England, 2007; BIS, 2011a, 2011b). While the US accounted for about 43% of 
the government and corporate bond volumes, its share of the ABS and CDO volumes was 
considerably higher, accounting for about 80%. Several economists both from the mainstream 
(e.g. UN, 2009; Rajan, 2010; Kumhof and Ranciére, 2010; Milanovic, 2011; Kumhof et al., 
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2012; Stiglitz 2012) and from heterodoxy (e.g. Hein, 2011; Wade, 2011; Galbraith, 2012; 
Stockhammer, 2012; van Treeck and Sturn, 2012; van Treeck; 2013) have argued that the 
growth of debt-backed securities in the US can in large part be attributed to the rise in income 
inequality as many of the bottom 90% US families sought to maintain their living standards and 
social status in the face of their stagnant wage growth and increasing top-incomes by resorting to 
debt (the ´keeping up with the Joneses´ effect). The statistics would seem to give strong backing 
to this line of argument, as the richest 1% of the US population increased their pre-tax market 
income share from roughly 10% at the beginning of the 1980s to 23.5% in 2007 (Atkinson et al., 
2011)
9
. Furthermore, “after 1987 the amount of income considered necessary to get along again 
increased strongly, by more than 40 per cent until 2007” while the increase in median income 
was much lower (15%) during the same period (van Treeck and Sturn, 2012, p.17). As a 
consequence, the debt to income ratios of the bottom 95% of the US population in terms of 
income distribution increased from around 70% in the mid-1980s to around 140% in 2007, while 
the debt to income ratios of the richest 5% of the US population stayed relatively constant at 
around 70% (Kumhof and Ranciere, 2010). 
However, these same statistics also point to a problem in the income inequality argument, 
namely, one of mismatching time frames. The trend rise in US inequality began in the early 
1980s but the growth of the US ABS market only began to accelerate after 2001.
 
Of the US$ 11 
trillion outstanding in mid-2007, over half (US$ 5.6 trillions) had been created in the previous 
four years. In the case of CDOs the acceleration in growth was even more remarkable in that of 
the US$ 3 trillion outstanding in June 2007 over 90% of these products had been created in the 
preceding four years. Proponents of the income inequality hypothesis have sought to get round 
this problem by arguing that prior to the stock market crash of 2001 low- and middle-income 
households were relying mainly on rising stock prices to finance their consumption and only 
began to rely more heavily on debt after this date. However, while this argument explains the 
rise in debt it does not explain the rise in the securitisation and re-securitisation of this debt. The 
same criticism can also be applied to the accompanying argument that financial inflows into the 
US from surplus countries (which also had rising income inequality and partly circumvented 
their domestic demand problem by increasing their exports) were particularly strong after 2001. 
These inflows into the US financial system certainly helped fuel bank lending to households but 
they still do not explain the securitisation of much of this lending. In the end, the massive 
expansion in US ABS and CDO stocks in so short a time span helps to explain why the majority 
of both mainstream and heterodox opinion continues to trace the root cause of this expansion to 
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a combination of regulatory failures (most notably, the official encouragement of the shift from 
an ‘originate and hold’ model of mortgage lending to an ‘originate and distribute’ model, a shift 
that inevitably contributed to the drastic relaxation of risk controls in mortgage lending) and 
monetary policy errors (most notably the maintenance of the Federal Funds rate at an unusually 
low level between the end of 2001 and mid-2004), which led to a boom in mortgage lending that 
in turn fuelled a property price bubble and the resulting social contagion of boom thinking 
(see Shiller, 2008). 
We do not underestimate the importance of regulatory and policy weaknesses, and the 
ensuing impact on social behaviour in financial markets, as drivers behind the pre-2007 growth 
of US ABS and CDO stocks. However, we also believe that economic inequality was as 
important a driver as becomes clear if attention is focussed on the vast accumulation of wealth in 
the hands of one small group of people. The rapid growth of US ABS stocks between 2002 and 
2007 coincided with the prolonged maintenance of the Federal Funds rate at an unusually low 
level over much of this period but it also exactly coincided with the sharp upward spike in 
aggregate investor demand for these securities. The US banks and their associates certainly took 
advantage of lax regulation and monetary loosening to vastly increase the rate of supply of ABSs 
and CDOs
10
 but it seems that despite their best efforts they were unable to fully satisfy investor 
demand as attested by the historically low US ABS yields and anecdotal evidence of market 
participants
11
. Once demand pressure is brought more centrally into the story behind the growth 
of these two markets so also is wealth inequality because HNWIs constituted an important 
source of demand for ABSs and CDOs. As we have seen, HNWIs were directly involved in the 
ABS market to the extent where they had a discernible negative effect on agency bond yields. 
By contrast, while HNWI involvement in the CDO market was as important as that in the ABS 
market, the form of that involvement was a good deal more complicated. 
One complication concerns the opaque nature of CDOs. For demand-pull pressure to be 
exerted in any product market the characteristics of the product in question have to be 
sufficiently transparent as to allow for a broad customer base. Ordinary government and 
corporate debt securities generally meet this criterion but so do asset backed securities inasmuch 
as their backing collateral consists of a single, homogenous class of assets (e.g. mortgage loans, 
credit card loans and so on). CDOs by contrast do not meet this transparency criterion. CDOs 
may only be ‘second-floor’ securities, but the jump in complexity and opacity going from ‘first-
floor’ ABSs to CDOs is considerably higher than the jump going from the ‘ground-floor’ 
Treasury, municipal and corporate bonds to ABSs. The securities backing CDOs consist of many 
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different types of asset classes. Given the heterogeneity of the backing assets, and the large 
variety of ways that these can be mixed together, it follows that no two CDOs are alike: each one 
is a unique, customized product that can be sold at a privately negotiated price but not so easily 
marketed on any standardized pricing terms. Although large institutional investors such as 
pension funds have the expertise to handle CDOs, regulatory and prudential constraints mean 
that they have to limit their exposure to the higher rated tranches of these products
12
. Individual 
investors by comparison have no such expertise, a fact that explains their complete absence in 
the CDO market. Given that HNWIs had no direct contact with CDOs between 2002 and 2007, 
the question arises as to how it was at all possible for these individuals to have been implicated 
in the rapid growth of these products over that period.  
One suggested answer is to direct attention to the hedge funds (Lysandrou, 2011-12).The 
acceleration in CDO production between 2002 and 2007 appears to have been very closely 
paralleled by an acceleration in the growth of the hedge fund industry. As shown in Figure 9a, 
hedge fund assets more than tripled between 2002 and 2007, rising from US$ 600 billion to 
about US$ 2.2 trillion, while the number of firms operating within the industry nearly doubled in 
this period. The two drivers behind the growth of the hedge fund industry were the increasing 
amounts of wealth of HNWIs, which was partly channelled into hedge funds, and the 
‘institutionalisation’ of the hedge funds’ client base. Institutional investments in hedge funds 
remained comparatively modest up to 2002 but after that date these investments rose rapidly (see 
Figure 9b) – a likely motivating factor being their search for yield13.  
< Figure 9 > 
Faced with these large inflows of client funds demanding yield, the hedge funds found that 
one of the most effective ways of meeting this demand was through investments in CDOs (see 
Lysandrou, 2011-12). By June 2007 hedge funds were the largest group of investors in CDOs, 
holding nearly a half of all these products (around US$ 1.4 trillion). In contrast to institutional 
asset managers, which had to severely restrict the amounts of the high risk and unrated CDO 
equity tranches that they bought on account of prudential and regulatory constraints, hedge funds 
faced no such constraints in their involvement in the CDO market. This meant that they could go 
long on the risky equity tranches thus enabling them to take advantage of their high yields while 
at the same time controlling for risk through the use of credit default swaps and put options. At 
the same time, however, they also held substantial amounts of the senior tranches (see Table 7) 
that were used as collateral to leverage their client’s capital by a factor of around four14. Both of 
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these strategies allowed them to generate the 11% average returns that were given back to 
investors in 2006 (Blundell-Wignall, 2007a; Farrel et al., 2007). To maximize gross returns on 
assets the hedge funds had to spend far more money than was given to them by clients, and to 
maximize the net returns that had to be given back to these clients, the hedge funds had to keep 
the costs of borrowing the extra sums of money to a minimum
15
. CDOs fitted into this equation 
supremely well. There were other securities such as emerging market bonds that gave high 
returns but could not be used as collateral in borrowing arrangements and there were other 
securities such as US Treasuries that could be used as collateral but gave poor returns. Only 
CDOs combined these two distinct advantages together because only they comprised triple-A 
rated securities at one end of the scale with unrated equity securities at the other end. 
< Table 7 > 
In view of the increasing reliance on CDOs as a means by which hedge funds could generate 
yield for clients, it follows that HNWIs had to have been heavily, if unconsciously, implicated in 
CDO growth by virtue of having continued to increase their investments in hedge funds after 
2002
16
. However, it is here that we come to another complication that marks off the role played 
by HNWIs in CDOs from that played by them in the ABS and other US debt securities markets. 
This concerns the distribution of wealth holdings amongst HNWIs. Far from being an even 
distribution, it on the contrary describes a reverse pyramid that is the inverse mirror image of the 
HNWI population ranked in terms of net wealth. Thus while the majority of relatively less 
wealthy HNWIs hold a minority of HNWI assets, at the other end of the scale a minority of 
HNWIs hold the majority of assets. In 2007, for example, ‘ultra’ HNWIs – individuals with net 
assets of over US$ 30 million of whom there were then about 100,000 – held approximately  
37% of the US$ 41 trillion global HNWI assets (Capgemini and Merrill Lynch, 2008). Despite 
this highly skewed distribution of HNWI wealth it is permissible to include all 10 million or so 
HNWIs in calculating their impact in the other US debt securities markets because these allowed 
for a ‘democratic’ HNWI participation not only on account of the transparency of the products 
but also on account of the low entry barriers to these markets. By contrast, the situation with 
CDOs is very different. While the opacity of these structured credit products barred all HNWIs 
from having any direct contact with them, the relative high entry barriers into hedge funds
17
 
effectively prevented a significant proportion of ‘low wealth’ HNWIs from having even an 
indirect effect on CDO growth via this intermediary channel. 
  14 
Our response to the above observations is to again evoke the ‘blocking’ hypothesis. Just as 
HNWIs taken as a whole occupied sufficient space in the traditional US debt securities markets 
as to add to the downward pressure on yields and hence to the ensuing search for yield, so also 
did a proportion of these same individuals occupy sufficient space in the hedge fund client base 
as to force hedge funds to resort to CDOs as a supplementary means of boosting yield. Two 
arguments can be advanced in support of this hypothesis. The first is that despite the increasing 
‘institutionalization’ of the hedge fund client base between 2002 and 2007, HNWIs remained, as 
already noted, the largest source of hedge fund capital. The second argument concerns the 
skewed structure of the hedge fund industry. Although the number of hedge funds rose from 
about 5,000 to about 10,000 over the 2002-7 period, this rise did nothing to alter the hugely 
uneven distribution of capital amongst these funds. If anything, the steep rise in capital inflows 
served to further accentuate the concentration of capital investments amongst the largest hedge 
funds as evidenced by the fact that in 2007 around 80% of all hedge funds’ assets were managed 
by the top 300 firms (IFSL, 2008b). It appears that HNWIs and institutional investors alike 
preferred to direct the bulk of their investments towards the large well-established hedge funds 
with a proven track record. The latter in turn, mindful of the increasing competition from other 
hedge funds, appeared to be reluctant to turn away new clients or to decline increased 
investments from established clients. Given the competitive pressure on the top hedge fund firms 
to find yield for their clients, and given the limits to how much yield could be generated from 
traditional investments products and strategies, it is understandable why these firms would 
increasingly turn to CDOs for a solution to the yield problem. 
In sum, hedge funds and wealth concentration were two of the key elements behind the 
importance of demand-pull factors in CDO growth after 2002. In light of the close correlation 
between low US bond yields and CDO growth in the 2002-2007 period, there has been no 
shortage of claims or suspicions on the part of academic economists and policy makers alike that 
the search for yield was a major source of pressure on the US banks to create CDOs (see King, 
2007; Gros 2009; Lysandrou 2009; Caballero 2010; Bernanke et al. 2011). If, however, all of 
this has yet to win more support for a demand-pull explanation of CDO growth this is because 
there has been until now no clear specification of the demand pressure transmission mechanism. 
Our view is that such a mechanism did exist, albeit that it was based not on a system of arm’s 
length and impersonal exchanges so much as on a dense network of personal relations between 
pairs of agents at the hub of which was the relation between the hedge funds and the investment 
banks (see Figure 10). Just as the hedge funds needed to plough substantial amounts of their 
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clients’ money into CDOs, because these helped to enhance returns while also helping to reduce 
leverage costs, so were the investment banks pressing the commercial banks and others into 
helping them to supply the hedge funds with CDOs because in addition to the fees earned from 
the sale of these products they could also make extra income from the extra business that was 
generated with the help of CDOs.  
< Figure 10> 
To understand the pivotal role of the investment bank-hedge fund relationship in the 
production of CDOs is also to understand the importance of income inequality and wealth 
concentration in providing the all-encompassing framework for the CDO production process, a 
point also illustrated in Figure 10. Take the role of US income inequality on the supply side of 
the production process. To create CDOs in abundance you need an abundant US demand for 
loans for which in turn you need an increasing polarisation of US incomes and, as we have seen, 
both of these preconditions were met in full. Now take the role of global wealth concentration on 
the demand side of the CDO production process. Hedge funds may have been the conduit 
through which the demand pressure for yield was transmitted through to the CDO creators but 
the ultimate source of that pressure were the clients of the hedge funds, and chief amongst these 
clients were HNWIs. The irony is that while the world’s HNWIs helped to create the US bond 
yield problem by virtue of channelling sizeable proportions of their wealth into the US bond 
markets, a proportion of these HNWIs then continued to be an important source of the pressure 
on the hedge funds to find ways of resolving that yield problem. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The majority of mainstream economists and government policy makers continue to believe 
that the financial crisis was caused by a mixture of de-regulation, wrong incentives, and a lax 
monetary policy rather than by an increasing unequal distribution of income and wealth. For that 
reason they continue to prioritise structural changes in the financial system rather than structural 
changes to the current system of inequality. The conclusion that falls out of the above analysis is 
that as much priority needs to be given to income and wealth redistribution as to financial 
regulation because economic inequality had co-primacy with regulatory failure as a root cause of 
the financial crisis. That crisis broke out in mid-2007 because the CDO market had grown to a 
size sufficient to cause havoc when it collapsed at this point in time. Absent the large numbers of 
  16 
American people who had low and stagnant incomes and you deprive the American banks of the 
raw material they needed in abundance to create CDOs on a mass scale. On the other side of the 
equation, absent the huge concentration of personal wealth amongst a very few individuals and 
you remove a vital source of the pressure on the American banks to create the CDOs on that 
mass scale. The first half of this story has been well told by others. This paper has sought to fill 
in some of the gaps in the second half of the story. 
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Figures / Tables  
 
Figure 1. Long and short-term interest rates in the US 
Note: The left plot compares the 3-month Eurodollar rate with the nominal 10-year Treasury yield. The right 
plot demonstrates the downward movement of traditional long-term bond yields in the US (Sources: Bloomberg, 
2010; FR Statistical Release H.15, 2010). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. US bond holdings from foreign and private domestic investors 
Note: The plots respectively show the US bond holdings of foreign governments (top left), foreign private 
investors (top right) and domestic private investors (bottom) (Sources: FR Statistical Release Z.1, 2010;TIC, 
2010). 
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Figure 3. Variables’ MCIs for the nominal 10-year Treasury yield (in % points) 
Note: These plots show the marginal cumulative impact of the demand variables on the nominal 10-year 
Treasury yield for each month during the ‘conundrum’ period according to the results of the Treasury yield 
model (see Appendix, Table A1). 
 
 
Figure 4. Variables’ MCIs for the nominal 10-year agency bond yield (in % points) 
Note: These plots show the marginal cumulative impact of the demand variables on the nominal 10-year agency 
bond yield for each month during the ‘conundrum’ period according to the results of the agency yield model (see 
Appendix, Table A2). 
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Figure 5. Variables’ MCIs for the nominal AAA-rated corporate bond yield (in % points) 
Note: These plots show the marginal cumulative impact of the demand variables on the nominal AAA-rated 
corporate bond yield for each month during the ‘conundrum’ period according to the results of the corporate 
yield model (see Appendix, Table A2). 
 
Figure 6. Variables’ MCIs for the nominal AAA-rated municipal bond yield (in % points) 
Note: These plots show the marginal cumulative impact of the demand variables on the nominal10-year AAA-
rated municipal bond yield for each month during the ‘conundrum’ period according to the results of the 
municipal  yield model (see Appendix, Table A2). 
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Figure 7. HNWIs assets under management, by region and by asset class (in US$ tr) 
Source: Capgemini and Merrill Lynch World Wealth Reports (2003-2008) 
 
 
Figure 8. Estimated impact of HNWIs demand on AAA-rated long-term yields (in % points) 
Note: These plots show the marginal cumulative impact of HNWIs according to the sum of the shares of US 
HNWIS in US individual holdings and ROW HNWIs in foreign private holdings and the MCIs of US individual 
investors and foreign private investors (see Figures 3-6). 
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Figure 9. Hedge Funds:number, assets under management, and source of capital 
Source: IFSL (2008b)  
 
 
Figure 10. Outline of the main forces in the CDO market 
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Table 1. Estimated bond holdings of US HNWIs (in US$tr) 
 
Source: own estimates; column 3 Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1. (2010) data 
Table 2. Estimated US bond holdings of US HNWIs sub-divided by bond type (in US$bn) 
 
Source: own estimates derived from Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1.(2010) data 
Table 3. Estimated global bond holdings of ROW HNWIs (in US$ tr) 
 
Source: own estimates derived from Capgemini and Merrill Lynch (2006, 2008) data 
Table 4. Estimated US bond holdings of ROW HNWIs (in US$ tr) 
 
Source: own estimates; column 2 data are derived from IMF Global Financial Stability Reports (2004-2008) 
US HNWIs global
bond  investment
US HNWIs invest-
ment in US bonds
US individual invest-
ment in US bonds
Jun-04 1.93 1.50 2.48
Jun-05 2.11 1.65 2.82
Jun-06 2.34 1.82 3.24
Jun-07 2.42 1.89 3.35
Jun-04
Jun-05
Jun-06
Jun-07
691
844
908
420
460
502
530
US Treasuries US agency bonds
US corporate and 
foreign bonds
US municipal 
bonds
238
238
316
202
176
247
215
305
604
HNWIs investment in 
fixed income
US HNWIs global bond 
investment
Investment of ROW 
HNWIs in bonds
Jun-04 7.37 1.93 5.44
Jun-05 7.01 2.11 4.90
Jun-06 7.81 2.34 5.47
Jun-07 10.99 2.42 8.57
ROW HNWIs invest-
ment in foreign bonds
US debt securities / 
world total
ROW HNWIs invest-
ment in US bonds
Jun-04 1.63 39% 0.63
Jun-05 1.47 40% 0.59
Jun-06 1.64 39% 0.64
Jun-07 2.57 37% 0.96
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Table 5. Estimated US bond holdings of ROW HNWIs sub-divided by bond type(in US$ bn) 
 
Source: own estimates derived from Global Financial Stability Report (2004-2008) data 
Table 6. Estimated holdings of all HNWIs in the US bond market 
 
 
Table 7. Holdings of CDO buyers by June 2007 
 
Source: Blundell-Wignall (2007b) 
Jun-04
Jun-05
Jun-06
Jun-07 123 105 721 13
97 87 402 9
106 84 439 10
US Treasuries US agency bonds
US corporate and 
foreign bonds
US municipal 
bonds
124 96 407 8
Jun-04
Jun-05
Jun-06
Jun-07 2,907
334
299
411
US Treasuries
362
335
423
325 1,629 542
total HNWIs invest-
ment in US bonds
US agency bonds
US corporate and 
foreign bonds
US municipal 
bonds
2,073 272 1,011 428
2,231 1,093 469
2,516 1,283 512
CDO
Tranche
 AAA  12% 15% 6% 7%
 AA  4% 4% 4% 1%
 A  5% 1% 3% 0%
 BBB  4% 0% 4% 1%
 BB  2% 0% 0% 0%
 Equity  19% 5% 2% 1%
 Total %   47% 25% 19% 10%
 Total US$ bn  1,396 746 564 295
 Banks
Asset
Managers
 Hedge Funds
 Insurance
Companies
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Footnotes 
1
 The term wealth refers most of the times to the amount of material assets that a person or household 
possesses minus the liabilities of that person or household (i.e. the net worth of a person or household). 
However, definitions and concepts that are used by wealth reports differ to some degree. The total 
absolute figures are taken from the World Wealth Reports of Capgemini and Merrill Lynch (CML), while 
the share of total wealth comes from the Boston Consulting Group´s (BCG) Global Wealth Report. CML 
include in their definition all equities, fixed income securities, cash and deposit holdings, real estate 
holdings (excluding primary residences), and alternative forms of investment, while consumables and 
consumer durables and collectibles are excluded. BCG’s Wealth Report is less inclusive and estimates the 
assets under management (AuM) from global private households on the basis of “cash deposits, money 
market funds, listed securities … and onshore and offshore assets [while] wealth attributed to investor’s 
own businesses, residences, or luxury goods” are excluded (2008, p.7).  
2
 As Coval et al. (2009, p.4) state, by “offering AAA-ratings along with attractive yields during a period 
of relatively low interest rates, these products were eagerly bought up by investors around the world.” 
3
 The MCI is the variable’s contribution to the yield relative to a chosen reference point, in this case May 
2004. The MCI depends on the changes in the holdings ratios and on the respective coefficients of the 
differenced and lagged level demand variables. The formula for calculating each month’s MCI is: 
                   
                          
                         
          (1) 
                              (2) 
4
 The holdings ratio (i.e. the amount of holdings divided by the outstanding amount of bonds) “is 
preferable to mere flow or stock figures because demand pressure can be expected to take place only 
when investors increase their holdings disproportionally to newly available bonds (i.e. if their holdings 
ratio increases).” (Goda et al., 2011, p. 11). 
5
 In the two decades prior to the subprime crisis there was a six fold increase in HNWI wealth – from 
US$ 7 trillion in 1986 (Haseler, 2000) to US$ 41 trillion in 2007 – while there was only a fourfold 
increase in world GDP over the same period (World Development Indicators, 2011).
 
6
 This percentage seems very reasonable given that in the US the “ownership of any type of bond is 
concentrated among the highest tiers of the income and wealth distributions” (Bucks et al., 2009, p. A22). 
7
 Data regarding foreign private investors’ use of tax havens and financial centres to invest in US 
Treasuries and in agency and corporate bonds are available from the Treasury International Capital 
System (TIC). Municipal bonds are not included in the TIC data (probably because only a relatively small 
amount is held by foreigners).
 
8
 The interest income of most municipal bonds is exempted from state and local taxes. Thus, the share of 
US individuals in total municipal bond holdings (around 36% in the conundrum period) was higher than 
in other bond classes.
 
9
 Although this polarisation gathered momentum during Clinton’s presidency as “the top 1% of income 
earners captured 45% of the total growth in (pre-tax) income” it accelerated even more rapidly during 
Bush’s first term of office as during this period “no less than 73% of total income growth accrued to the 
top 1%” (Palma, 2009, p. 842). 
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10
 In his testimony to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), Charles Prince (ex Citigroup CEO) 
stated that “Securitization could be seen as a factory line … As more and more and more of these 
subprime mortgages were created as raw material for the securitization process” (2011, p.102); while 
David Sambol, the President and CEO of Countrywide (the largest mortgage originator in the US) 
admitted that in the run up to the subprime crisis the chief business purpose of his company was to be a 
“seller of securities to Wall Street … originating what was salable in the secondary market.”, a point 
exemplified by the fact that it “sold or securitized 87% of the $1.5 trillion in mortgages it originated 
between 2002 and 2005” (p.105). 
11
 Mike Francis, executive director at Morgan Stanley on the residential mortgage trading desk, stated in 
an interview: “We almost couldn't produce enough to keep the appetite of our investors happy. More 
people wanted bonds than we could actually produce. That was our difficult task, was trying to produce 
enough. They would call and say, we're looking for more fixed rate. What have you got? Do you have 
anything coming? What's going on? Tell us what you're trying to do. From our standpoint it's like, there's 
a guy out there with a lot of money. And we have got to find a way to become his sole provider of bonds, 
of mortgage bonds, to fill his appetite. And his appetite's massive.” (This American Life, 2008). To be 
able to produce the huge quantities that were needed standards were lowered not only to bring more 
numbers of subprime borrowers into the mortgage market but also to speed up the whole mortgage 
origination process. Furthermore, it was not only poor households that were supplied with subprime loans; 
households with good credit scores were also “pushed into risky subprime loans [because] lenders or 
brokers aggressively marketed the loans, offering easier and faster approvals, [this] was fuelled with 
faxes and emails from lenders to brokers touting easier qualification for borrowers and attractive payouts” 
(Brooks and Simon, 2007). 
12
 For example, “Pension funds … face ratings-based regulations. A recent survey of two hundred 
pension plan sponsors and investment managers in the US and Europe (Cantor et al., 2007) found that  
75% have minimum rating requirements for bond purchases and 50% set limits on portfolio distribution 
by rating class.” (Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2009, p. 20). According to estimates provided by Blundell-
Wignall (2007b) 29% of the US$ 3 trillion worth of CDOs outstanding at mid-2007 were held by 
institutional investors, but most of these holdings (around 90%) fell into the A- and B-rated categories. 
This contrasts sharply with the hedge funds who held 40% of their CDOs in equity tranches. 
13
 The large institutional investors typically assign the majority of their assets to core portfolios that 
match expected returns with acceptable levels of risk (partly due to regulatory reasons). Having safely 
covered most assets under their management, these investors then typically assign a small proportion to 
the much riskier, but reputedly much higher yielding, 'alternative' investment classes such as private 
equity, hedge funds and CDOs. What appears to have happened from 2002 onwards is that the problem of 
yield on traditional assets became so acute that institutional investors were motivated to increase their 
exposure to the alternative investment classes by more than what was usual before. 
14
 Leverage also is the explanation why hedge funds could hold so many CDOs although their assets 
under management were ‘only’ US$ 2.2 trillion. The downside to the hedge fund’s heavy use of leverage 
to increase their CDO holdings was that it exposed to them to the risk of liquidity withdrawal, as actually 
happened in 2007. However, while excessive leverage was instrumental to the collapse of many hedge 
funds during the financial crisis, and to the collapse of an even greater proportion of the bank-sponsored 
conduits and SIVs, it was not what triggered the collapse. That trigger was to be found in the opacity and 
complexity of the CDOs. After all, as was made very clear in Brunnermeier’s (2009) event logbook of the 
crisis, it was the BNP Paribas announcement on August 9th of 2007 to the effect that it could not value 
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the CDOs held by three of its hedge funds that spread widespread panic in the financial markets, which in 
turn led to the complete withdrawal of liquidity. 
15
 In 2001 and 2002 hedge funds returns were relatively low compared with other investment 
opportunities (6.3% and 0.1% respectively). Between 2003 and 2007 the return of hedge funds increased 
to an average of 11.6% (with some funds having much higher returns, which together with portfolio 
reasons explains the increasing amount of investment in hedge funds). Nevertheless, hedge funds were 
under constant pressure to increase these returns as the average S&P 500 return was 13.2% during the 
same period (IFSL, 2009). 
16
 Due to the existing regulations, individual investment in hedge funds came almost to 100% from 
HNWIs. This means that hedge fund assets from HNWIs were increasing from around US$ 0.5 trillion in 
2002 to around US$ 1.1 trillion in 2007. 
17
 According to SEC regulation only individuals with a minimum net worth of US$ 5 million or in special 
cases with a net worth of US$ 1 million and at least US$ 200,000 in income in the last two years are 
allowed to invest in hedge funds. For funds of hedge funds the regulations are similar.  
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Appendix 
When quantifying the impact of demand on bond yields all major determinants of yields have 
to be taken into account. These determinants broadly divide into three groups: those relating to 
macroeconomic essentials, those relating to financial risk (see Rudebusch et al., 2006; Wu, 
2008) and those relating to investor demand (see Bandholz et al. 2009; Craine and Martin 2009; 
Warnock and Cacdac Warnock, 2009). Accordingly, the long-term yields are influenced by the 
following factors: 
                      (A1) 
Where y
l 
denotes the long term interest rate, i
s
 the short-term interest rate, π current inflation, 
πe inflation expectations, ye growth expectations and rp is a risk premium for the expected 
default risk and macroeconomic and financial volatility, while d denotes investor demand for 
bonds. 
Based on (A1) Goda et al. (2011) develop four Autoregressive Distributed Lags (ARDL) 
models, to test which of these factors depressed the long-term yields of AAA-rated bonds in the 
bond yield ‘conundrum’ period. The general form of these models is: 
   
     ∑          
 
      ∑          
 
    ∑        
  
          
  
∑        
 
       (A2) 
The main reasons for choosing the ARDL modelling technique were that, firstly, it was 
infeasible for their purpose to use stationary vector autoregression (VAR) and vector error 
correction models (VECM) because of the large number of variables involved and the 
incorporation of lags and, secondly, most of the variables are non-stationary but some are 
stationary. It should be further noted that Goda et al. report that in each bond class a structural 
change took place during the sample period, the dates of these changes apparently being 
November 1998 in the Treasury market, February 1999 in the AAA-rated corporate bond 
market, and April 2004 in the agency and municipal bond markets. What follows are the models 
that account for these structural breaks as these are Goda et al.’s favoured models for inference 
due to their superior fit
1
. 
                                               
1
 See Goda et al. (2011) for a detailed discussion of the model specification, model selection, andfor possible 
reasons for the structural breaks and their influence on the variables. 
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Table A1. Parsimonious model of the nominal 10-year Treasury yield 
 
Note: This table summarizes the results of our ARDL-model for the nominal 10-year Treasury yield. Where ∆ is the 
difference operator, the number of lags are indicated in parentheses as a suffix to a variable’s name, s11/98 indicates 
the shift component of a variable and the date of the structural break (i.e. after November 1998), YIELD is the 10-
year nominal Treasury yield, FOROFFICIAL are foreign official holdings as a ratio of total outstanding long-term 
Treasuries, FORPRIVATE are foreign private holdings as a ratio of total outstanding long-term Treasuries, 
EURDOL is the 3-month Eurodollar rate, LOGISM is the log of the ISM-Index, PCE is the actual PCE inflation rate, 
DOW is the value of the Dow Jones Index, and MOVE is the Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate Index. 
Intercepts are not reported but are included in the models. In each column coefficients and t-statistics (in 
parenthesis) are reported. Probability values for all misspecification tests are reported in the section headed 
misspecification/cointegration tests, where BG(x) denotes the probability value of the Breusch-Godfrey test for x 
order correlation and Arch(x) the probability value of the ARCH heteroskedasticity test with x lags. The 5% critical 
values for the bounds cointegration test with unrestricted intercept and no trend are (i) F=3.39, t=-4.72, (ii) F=3.50, 
t=-5.03 [(i) k=8, (ii) k=10 (t), k=7 (F)]. The significance of a coefficient or test statistic at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
of significance is indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively (Source: Goda et al., 2011). 
 
∆(FOROFFICIAL) -0.2155*** (-6.81)
∆(FOROFFICIAL(-1)) -0.1325*** (-4.11) FOROFFICIAL -0.0944*** (-7.14)
∆(EUR_DOL)   0.7202***   (4.38) FORPRIVATE -0.2396*** (-5.82
∆(EURDOL)s11/98 -0.5256*** (-2.98) EURDOL   0.4478***   (4.50)
∆(EURDOL(-1)) -0.1630* (-1.78) LOGISM   3.3286***   (5.52)
∆(LOGISM)   1.0200***   (2.65) PCE   0.9426***   (3.72)
∆(LOGISM(-1))   1.6376***  (2.86) DOW   0.0005***   (5.56)
∆(LOGISM(-1))s11/98 -1.2539* (-1.80) MOVE   0.0070***   (2.88)
∆(LOGISM(-4))   0.8844***   (2.66)
∆(PCE)   0.5403***   (2.90) FOROFFICIAL -0.0944*** (-7.14)
∆(PCE(-9)) -0.6432*** (-3.12) FORPRIVATE   0.0038   (0.07)
∆(DOW)   0.0001**   (3.14) EURDOL   0.1113***  (2.85)
YIELD(-1) -0.3795*** (-6.63) LOGISM   2.5283***   (3.61)
FOROFFICIAL(-1) -0.0358*** (-4.67) PCE   0.9426***   (3.72)
FORPRIVATE(-1) -0.0909*** (-6.50) DOW   0.0005***   (5.56)
FORPRIVATE(-1)s11/98   0.0924***   (3.62) MOVE   0.0070***   (2.88)
EURDOL(-1)   0.1700***   (3.45)
EURDOL(-1)s11/98 -0.1277*** (-2.73)
LOGISM(-1)   1.2634***   (4.69) BG(2) prob.
LOGISM(-1)s11/98   0.3038** (-2.29) BG(12) prob.
PCE(-1)   0.3578***   (3.28) Jarque-Bera prob.
DOW(-1)   0.0002***   (5.88) Arch(1) prob.
MOVE(-1)   0.0027***   (2.78) Arch(12) prob.
adj. R-squared   0.64 White prob.
Schwarz criterion -0.54 Ramsey LR prob.
Sample: 1994:02 to 2007:06 (161 observations) Wu-Hausm. prob.
Bounds test F-stat.
Bounds test t-stat.      -6.63***
0.15
0.58
       8.20***
0.24
0.36
0.26
0.56
0.49
0.61
(i) model (ii) equilibrium long-run effects
before the break
after the break
misspecification/cointegration tests
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Table A2. Parsimonious model of the nominal long term yields of AAA-rated 
non-Treasury US securities 
 
Note: This table summarizes the results of our ARDL-models for the nominal 10-year US agency, and AAA-rated 
corporate and municipal bond yields, respectively. The table notes are the same as in Table A1, with the following 
exceptions: s
x/x
 indicates the shift component of a variable with the date of the structural break indicated by x/x (i.e. 
after February 1999 and after April 2001), YIELD is the 10-year nominal yield of the respective bond class, 
FOROFFICIAL are foreign official holdings as a ratio of total outstanding bonds (i.e. the holdings ratio) of the 
respective bond class, FORPRIVATE is the foreign private holdings ratio of the respective bond class, FOREIGN is 
the foreign holdings ratio of municipal bonds, USBANK is the US banking institutions holdings ratio of the 
respective bond class, USINDIVIDUAL is the US individual holdings ratio of the respective bond class, 
USINSURANCE is the US insurance companies holdings ratio of the respective bond class, USPENSION is the US 
pension funds holdings ratio of the respective bond class, and EDFAAA is Moody’s expected default frequency for 
AAA-rated corporate bonds. The 5% critical values for a Bounds cointegration test with unrestricted intercept and 
no trend are (i) F=3.30, t≈-5.20 , (ii) F=3.39, t=-5.03, (iii) F=3.24, t≈-5.20 [(i) k=11 (t), k=9 (F) (ii) k=10 (t), k=8 (F) 
(iii) k=10 (F), k=11 (t)] (Source: Goda et al., 2011). 
 
  
∆(FOROFFICIAL) -1.7414*** (-5.68) ∆(YIELD(-1))   0.0956   (1.61) ∆(YIELD(-1))s04/01   0.4644***   (4.57)
∆(FORPRIVATE) -0.4600*** (-3.45) ∆(FORPRIVATE) -0.3983*** (-9.59) ∆(YIELD(-1))s04/01   0.3334***   (3.59)
∆(USINDIVIDUALS) -0.1321*** (-2.98) ∆(FORPRIVATE(-1)) -0.2464*** (-5.10) ∆(YIELD(-3))
s04/01
  0.2833***   (3.22)
∆(EURDOL)   0.4803***   (3.80) ∆(US INDIVIDUAL(-1)) -0.1792*** (-5.90) ∆(YIELD(-4))   0.2293***   (3.70)
∆(LOGISM)   1.4678***   (3.11) ∆(USBANK(-1)) -0.3478*** (-4.28) ∆(YIELD(-5))   0.2166***   (3.62)
∆(PCE)   0.6020**   (2.50) ∆(EURDOL(-1)) -0.1658*** (-2.59) ∆(EURDOL)   0.7231***   (8.42)
∆(PCE(-2))
s04/01
-0.8739*** (-2.82) ∆(EURDOL(-8))
s02/99
-0.3045*** (-4.24) ∆(EURDOL(-2))
s04/01
-0.3469** (-2.34)
∆(DOW)s04/01   0.0003***   (4.95) ∆(EURDOL(-11))   0.1275**   (2.24) ∆(EURDOL(-8))s04/01 -0.3734*** (-2.87)
∆(MOVE)s04/01   0.0094***   (4.95) ∆(LOGISM)   0.6734**   (2.39) ∆(PCE)   0.9009***   (5.03)
YIELD(-1) -0.4101*** (-7.87) ∆(LOGISM(-1))   1.5553***   (3.82) ∆(DOW)s04/01   0.0002***   (3.85)
FOROFFICIAL(-1) -0.4626*** (-3.27) ∆(LOGISM(-1))s02/99 -1.4720*** (-3.03) ∆(DOW(-5))   0.0001***   (2.61)
FOROFFICIAL(-1)s04/01   0.4027***   (3.32) ∆(PCE)   0.4381***   (3.29) ∆(MOVE)   0.0033***   (3.19)
FORPRIVATE(-1) -0.2168*** (-3.11) ∆(PCE(-9)) -0.4191*** (-2.91) ∆(MOVE(-2)) -0.0027*** (-2.96)
USINDIVIDUAL(-1) -0.0514*** (-3.54) ∆(DOW)   0.0001***   (3.21) YIELD10(-1) -0.5913*** (-8.75)
USPENSION(-1)
s04/01
-0.1441*** (-3.07) YIELD(-1) -0.2273*** (-6.56) YIELD(-1)
s04/01
-0.4765*** (-6.14)
EURDOL(-1)   0.2218***   (5.02) FORPRIVATE(-1) -0.2113*** (-5.37) FOREIGN(-1) -4.9958*** (-6.30)
LOGISM(-1)   1.3153***   (4.34) FORPRIVATE(-1)
s02/99
  0.1615***   (4.50) FOREIGN(-1)
s04/01
  4.1318***   (6.05)
PCE(-1)   0.8260***   (6.30) EURDOL(-1)   0.0664***   (4.83) USINDIVIDUAL(-1) -0.1010*** (-4.27)
DOW(-1)   0.0002***   (4.53) LOGISM(-1)   0.6125***   (3.51) USINSURANCE(-1) -0.0747*** (-2.60)
MOVE(-1)   0.0036**   (2.24) LOGISM(-1)s02/99 -0.5380*** (-4.33) USBANK(-1) -0.2470** (-2.07)
MOVE(-1)s04/01   0.0061***   (2.80) PCE(-1)   0.1906***   (2.88) EURDOL(-1)   0.2054***   (6.09)
adj. R-squared CPI10Y(-1)   0.3002**   (2.29) LOGISM(-1)   0.6388***   (2.73)
Schwarz criterion DOW(-1)   0.0001***   (5.61) PCE(-1)   0.3050***   (3.66)
Sample: 1995:01 to 2007:06 (150 obs.) MOVE(-1)   0.0016**   (2.34) DOW(-1)   0.0001***   (3.71)
EDFAAA(-1)   3.0898***   (5.60) MOVE(-1)   0.0055***   (4.82)
adj. R-squared adj. R-squared 0.57
Schwarz criterion Schwarz criterion -0.61
Sample: 1994:02 to 2007:06 (161 obs.) Sample: 1994:02 to 2007:06 (161 obs.)
Results misspecification/cointegration tests
BG(2) prob.: (i) 0.89, (ii) 0.65, (iii) 0.23         BG(12) prob.: (i) 0.26, (ii) 0.15, (iii) 0.10         Jarque-Bera prob.: (i) 0.44, (ii) 0.99, (iii) 0.54
-1.19
(i) Agency (ii) Corporate
Bounds test: F-stat. (i) 8.68***, (ii) 10.41***, (iii) 10.39***; t-stat. (i) -7.87***, (ii) -6.56***, (iii) -9.85***
Arch(1) prob.: (i) 0.61, (ii) 0.86, (iii) 0.41     Arch(12) prob.: (i) 0.56, (ii) 0.15, (iii) 0.87      White prob.:  (i) 0.47, (ii) 0.31, (iii) 0.06
Ramsey LR prob.: (i) 0.16, (ii) 0.26, (iii) 0.23      Wu-Hausman Prob.: F-stat. (i) 0.46, (ii) 0.55, (iii) 0.86
(iii) Municipal
0.63
-0.09
0.71
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Table A3. Equilibrium long-run impacts on the nominal long term yields of AAA-rated 
non-Treasury US securities 
 
Note: This table summarizes the equilibrium results of our ARDL-models for the nominal 10-year US agency, and 
AAA-rated corporate and municipal bond yields, respectively. The table notes are the same as in Table A1 and 
Table A2 (Source: Goda et al., 2011). 
 
 
FOROFFICIAL -1.1282*** (-3.82) FORPRIVATE -0.9298*** (-5.39) FOREIGN -8.4493*** (-5.64)
FORPRIVATE -0.5286*** (-3.43) EURDOL   0.2923***   (5.18) USINDIVIDUAL -0.1709*** (-4.33)
USINDIVIDUAL -0.1253*** (-3.93) LOGISM   2.6953***   (3.24) USINSURANCE -0.1263*** (-2.83)
USPENSION PCE   0.8387***   (3.15) USBANK -0.4178** (-2.08)
EURDOL   0.5410***   (6.83) CPI10Y   1.3207**   (2.42) EURDOL   0.3473***   (8.47)
LOGISM   3.2074***   (4.80) DOW   0.0005***   (5.56) LOGISM   1.0805***   (3.17)
PCE   2.0143***   (7.82) MOVE   0.0071**   (2.51) PCE   0.5159***   (3.74)
DOW   0.0004***   (4.53) EDFAAA 13.5957***   (6.33) DOW   0.0002***   (3.36)
MOVE   0.0088**   (2.20) MOVE   0.0093***   (4.63)
FOROFFICIAL -0.1462* (-1.73) FORPRIVATE -0.2193*** (-5.63) FOREIGN -0.8091*** (-7.00)
FORPRIVATE -0.5286*** (-3.43) EURDOL   0.2923***   (5.18) USINDIVIDUAL -0.0946*** (-5.45)
USINDIVIDUAL -0.1253*** (-3.93) LOGISM   0.3282   (0.43) USINSURANCE -0.0699*** (-2.92)
USPENSION -0.3514*** (-3.10) PCE   0.8387***   (3.15) USBANK -0.2314** (-2.18)
EURDOL   0.5410***   (6.83) CPI10Y   1.3207**   (2.42) EURDOL   0.1923***   (7.97)
LOGISM   3.2074***   (4.80) DOW   0.0005***   (5.56) LOGISM   0.5983***   (2.88)
PCE   2.0143***   (7.82) MOVE   0.0071**   (2.51) PCE   0.2857***   (3.94)
DOW   0.0004***   (4.53) EDFAAA 13.5957***   (6.33) DOW   0.0001***   (4.07)
MOVE   0.0237***   (5.91) MOVE   0.0051***   (4.58)
after the break after the break after the break
(i) Agency bond yield (ii) Corporate bond yield (iii) Municipal bond yield
before the break before the break before the break
